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Share repurchases have come under criticism as they may be used for earnings management 
and take capital away from productive investment. However, share repurchases can also reduce 
the agency costs of free cash flow and offset the dilution of current shareholders. Whether firms 
engage in good or manipulative share repurchases can crucially hinge on the quality of 
corporate governance. Using UK firm panel data, we study the effect of independent directors 
on repurchase policies. Our results indicate that board independence increases the propensity 
to engage in share repurchases. Moreover, board independence attenuates the harmful effect of 
manipulative share repurchases on employment growth. Our approach exploits the passage of 
a corporate governance reform which provided a unique opportunity to tease out the causal 
impact of independent directors on share repurchases. Our findings advocate in favor of more 
active involvement of independent directors in payout policies. 
 
 






“Discussion on share buybacks has gotten much more sophisticated in the last decade. I do 
not think that boards were all asking the right questions about buybacks 10 years ago – more 
could have been asked about alternative investment opportunities, effects on rating agencies, 
investor preferences, compensation implications. But in my experience, across industries, 
boards and management teams are more sophisticated than they once were.” 
 
The Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (2016) 
 
1. Introduction 
A voluminous strand of research has been devoted to understanding the roles and functioning 
of the board of directors (Merendino et al., 2018; Merendino & Sarens, 2020). It is now 
recognized that the board of directors provides a fundamental service for the prosperity of the 
company (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). To try to ensure objectivity in board 
decisions, it is important that a firm grants representation to a sufficient number of (non-
executive) independent directors, where independence is determined by the absence of 
relationships or circumstances that may affect the director’s judgment. 
If board oversight is relevant for a firm’s prospects, then a question arises as to which 
domain of corporate policies would independent directors influence and how. Existing studies 
have mostly investigated the impact of independent boards on issues related to accounting 
transparency (Armstrong, Core, & Guay, 2014), strategic decisions such as M&As (Dahya, 
Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2016), innovation (Balsmeier, Fleming, & Manso, 2017), 
executive pay (Conyon & Peck, 1998) and to the ultimate implications for shareholder value 
(e.g. B. D. Nguyen & Nielsen, 2010).  
The role of independent directors in determining a firm’s payout policies remains far 
less explored. Yet, it is estimated that the US corporate boards have authorized $1 trillion in 
share repurchases in 2018, underscoring the importance of boards in driving share repurchases 
to such a record peak level.2 Current debates amongst academics and practitioners have thus 
 




begun to explore the potential role of independent directors surrounding capital allocation 
decisions such as those regarding share repurchases.  
Some of the literature takes a negative view on share repurchases, asserting that they 
provide a way of distorting information flows (Brockman, Khurana, & Martin, 2008) or 
boosting the firm’s share price to mislead investors (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, & Wang, 2010). 
Moreover, share repurchases are more likely when executives are overconfident and own a 
large number of options outstanding (Banerjee, Humphery-Jenner, & Nanda, 2018; Kahle, 
2002). Relatedly, there is evidence that managers engage in share repurchases for earnings 
management purposes (Hribar, Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006), which in turn harms employment 
and investment (Almeida, Fos, & Kronlund, 2016). Collectively, these findings suggest that 
share repurchases generate temporary benefits for self-interested executives (e.g., by improving 
the conditions of equity sales) at the expense of long-term investors (Cheng, Harford, & Zhang, 
2015; Lazonick, 2014). Even in times of economic downturns, like the crisis related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, companies are seeking ways to pay back shares and maintain the existing 
dividend payout policy by borrowing (Raval, 2020).  
Other streams of literature take a positive view, suggesting that share repurchases grant 
firms with greater financial flexibility (Jagannathan, Stephens, & Weisbach, 2000), reduce the 
agency cost of free cash flow (Nohel & Tarhan, 1998), and offset the dilutive effect of employee 
stock options (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003). Accordingly, share repurchases have 
been linked to both short-term and long-term excess returns (Chang & Puthenpurackal, 2014; 
Manconi, Peyer, & Vermaelen, 2019). Interestingly, survey evidence highlights that US board 
directors have a positive view on share repurchases, suggesting that they do not jeopardize 
growth and do not drive excessive CEO compensation at the expense of shareholders (The 




A natural question is thus whether independent directors can curb share repurchases 
that are harmful to the firm’s long-term prospects while promoting those repurchases that are 
appropriate to the firm’s investment opportunities and valuation. Or, by contrast, whether 
independent directors would be unable to achieve these goals, due e.g. to problems of collusion 
with the management team (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2012) or lack of influence or 
knowledge and expertise in the matter. Unfortunately, the literature on this question is still 
inconclusive. Further, establishing the direction of causality between board independence and 
share repurchases is complicated by the well-known problem that corporate governance 
mechanisms are endogenously determined institutions (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). Indeed, 
a given level of board independence is likely to be an equilibrium point reflecting a firm’s 
complexity, monitoring, and advising needs (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008), which may, in turn, 
correlate with corporate policies.  
Establishing the causal influence of independent directors on share repurchases is one 
of the goals of our study. To this end, drawing on Dahya et al. (2016), we use as identification 
strategy an exogenous event provided by a corporate governance reform (the Higgs Report 
issued in the UK in January 2003), which decreed that corporate boards of UK listed firms 
comprise a majority of independent non-executive directors. This exogenous influx of 
independent directors on the boards of UK companies allows us to estimate difference-in-
differences and two-stage least square regressions that tease out the effect of board 
independence on share repurchases.  
Using a panel dataset of UK-listed firms from 2000 to 2007, we first establish the direct 
effect of independent directors on the total amount of share repurchases (and dividends). Our 
results, robust to a variety of empirical specifications, indicate that an increase in board 
independence positively affects the propensity of firms to engage in share repurchases. This 




long-term growth (Almeida et al., 2016; Hribar et al., 2006; Lazonick, 2014). To probe into this 
issue, we investigate how the effect of independent directors varies depending on the motives 
behind share repurchases. We then explore how board independence influences the real effects 
of share repurchases. Separating accretive firms (i.e. those firms that undertake share 
repurchases for manipulative purposes) from non-accretive firms, we find that independent 
directors significantly attenuate the negative effects of accretive share repurchases on firm 
employment. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we study the underexplored 
relationship between board independence and both the level and quality of share repurchases 
by using a methodology which deals with the well-known problem of endogeneity in corporate 
governance, according to which board structures and payout decisions are jointly determined 
(and likely affected by unobservables). Several scholars have used corporate governance 
reforms as a source of exogenous variations in board characteristics (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). 
Our approach exploits the passage of a reform which, by spurring board independence in UK 
listed firms during the mid-2000s, provided a unique opportunity to tease out the causal impact 
of independent directors on share repurchases.  
Second, while we are proposing a robust identification strategy, we are also focusing on 
share repurchases from a novel angle. Oswald and Young (2008) explore how firms can 
minimize the agency cost of free cash flow and argue that share repurchases represent a double-
edged sword. By being more flexible and less sticky than dividends, share repurchases can be 
effectively used to disgorge random cash shocks. However, in the absence of mechanisms that 
align shareholder and executive interests, the high flexibility of share repurchases may increase 
managerial discretion on the commitment to deploy or retain excess cash. While there is a rich 
literature on the firm- or executive-level determinants of share repurchases (e.g. Barth & 




assessment of the role played by corporate governance mechanisms. A notable exception is 
Sharma (2011) which, however, is mostly focused on dividends and does not document 
significant effects of independent directorship on the level of share repurchases. Dividends and 
share repurchases have been proven different payout mechanisms (De Cesari, 2012) – they exist 
for different reasons and have different effects, and hence they may be influenced differently 
by board independence. While dividends are ‘sticky’ and more frequent, share repurchases are 
irregular, more significant, and more prone to manipulation. In view of these arguments, it is 
reasonable to examine dividend behavior independently of repurchases. We address this gap by 
focusing on independent directors and document the positive effect of independent directors in 
spurring a firm’s share repurchase activities. 
Third, we address the important question of whether independent directors shape the 
real effects of share repurchases by examining whether their impact stems from a reallocation 
of funds away from valuable projects or an attentive decision to return funds to shareholders, 
e.g. due to the lack of investment opportunities or excess cash (Boudry et al., 2013). The 
existing literature documents that repurchases motivated by earnings-per-share concerns are 
detrimental to firm employment and investment (Almeida et al., 2016). However, no studies to 
our knowledge have analyzed how the real effects of repurchases vary as a function of 
exogenous variations in board independence. This omission is particularly important in light of 
the evidence suggesting that firms with strong and weak corporate governance tend to 
experience different patterns of performance following share repurchase plans (Caton, Goh, 
Lee, & Linn, 2016; Manconi et al., 2019). Our study fills this gap by showing that an influx of 
independent directors can significantly mitigate the harmful consequences of accretive 






2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1. Independent directors – what are they for? 
Corporate governance reforms around the world, from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to the more 
recent experiences of the “codes of good governance” (Aguilera & Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009), 
have placed a great deal of emphasis on the value of board independence and the role of 
independent directors for firms’ decision-making. Independent directors provide key support to 
monitoring activities and advising about complex decisions such as those related to capital 
allocation. Despite the relevance of independent directors for a firm’s performance, testing the 
impact of independent directors has proven challenging. First, ascertaining the true degree of 
independence is a complicated task (Adams, 2017). Second, the level of independence in a 
firm’s board is an endogenous outcome shaped by past performance as well as unobservable 
factors that, in turn, confound the estimation of independent directors on firm outcomes 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). As a result, the evidence on the corporate value of independent 
directors has been inconclusive for a long time. More recent studies based on exogenous events 
(e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010), however, have detected a positive impact consistent with the 
idea that independent directors are value-enhancing. 
 
2.2. Independent directors and share repurchases 
Share repurchases, also commonly known as share buybacks, represent the re-acquisition by a 
company of its stock. A repurchase plan often referred to as a buyback program, is a written 
policy approved by the board of directors (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). Share repurchases 
represent a growing practice, also due to pressure from external constituents (Westphal & Zajac, 
2001). Von Eije and Megginson (2008) observe that in Europe the total value of share 
repurchases in 2005 accounted for over 50 percent of the total value of cash dividends. Young 




million in 1998 to nearly £28 billion in 2006. Driver, Grosman, and Scaramozzino (2020) report 
that the number of dividend payers in the UK fell almost monotonically from a peak of 1,266 
in 1998 to 743 in 2012, while the total increase in payout over time was accounted for by 
growing share repurchases and a smaller number of dividend-paying firms. Extant literature 
found that repurchases were generally insignificant of dividends (Bhargava, 2010). Driver et 
al. (2020) found little evidence of substitution between dividends and repurchases in the UK, 
except perhaps for the post-financial crisis period (outside of our study period), when 
repurchases continued with an upward trend while dividends retreated. Benhamouda (2007) 
suggests only weak substitutability in the UK, at least up until the early 2000s or imperfect 
substitutability constrained by regulation. Several tax and governance-based reasons for limited 
substitutability are reviewed in the literature (Hu & Kumar, 2004). 
Share repurchases have been surrounded by heated controversies. Some studies, for 
instance, have suggested that a firm’s effort to repurchase its shares may be detrimental to 
capital expenditures and employment growth (The Investor Responsibility Research Center 
Institute, 2016). Other studies suggested that share repurchases increase with the level of CEOs 
overconfidence, especially when entrenchment increases their discretion over corporate 
policies, and are financed with reductions in productive investments (Banerjee et al., 2018). 
Moreover, share repurchases provide opportunistic managers with a tool to increase the firm’s 
share price to mislead investors (Chan et al., 2010) and manage earnings per share (Hribar et 
al., 2006). In turn, they generate temporary benefits for executives e.g., by improving the 
conditions of equity-linked compensation (Geiler & Renneboog, 2016; Petrou & Procopiou, 
2016), while sacrificing resources that could have been channeled to productive investments in 
assets, R&D or labor (Almeida et al., 2016). It is that tension between the possible destruction 
of real outcomes and employment growth on the one hand, and the redistribution of value to 




growth is a leading metric of firm productivity and its importance to the UK economy has been 
emphasized by the government through recent employment law reviews as a way to support 
economic growth (Pickard & Foster, 2021), making it worthwhile for scholarly attention. 
Boards can play a central role in capital return decisions. The relationship between a 
company’s strategy, its desired capital structure, and financial strength demands robust board 
oversight. Since independent directors must represent the interests of all the shareholders, they 
would be more unbiased when it comes to decisions about share repurchases relative to board 
members representing particular shareholders with a marked preference for capital return. 
Hence, the role of independent directors is to restrain executives’ tendency to engage in payout 
actions that generate private benefits and impartially ensure that a company returns funds to 
shareholders through share repurchases only when there is no other valuable use for these cash 
funds in the foreseeable future. The presence of independent directors and the space that they 
take in the board discussion decrease the ability of insiders to opportunistically engage in share 
repurchases for private benefit motives. Even if independent directors are passive on the board, 
they are indirectly reducing the influence of the insiders on the propensity of share repurchases. 
Building on these arguments, we suggest that: 
H1a. A greater share of independent directors has a negative effect on share repurchases under 
the assumption that share repurchases are bad. 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) suggest that a primary reason why share repurchases have 
become more appealing lies in that they are more flexible than dividends. During periods of 
low-growth and low-interest rates, companies may struggle to find enough good opportunities 
and may have no better option than to return excess capital to shareholders (Brav et al., 2015). 
The greater flexibility of share repurchases enables firms to time the payout decision to the 
availability of investment opportunities and the market valuation of their equity (Brav et al., 




are “sticky” payout commitments, and thus repurchases can be used to alleviate the agency cost 
of free cash flow (Nohel & Tarhan, 1998). Another important advantage of share repurchases 
is that they help to offset the dilutive effect of employee stock options and thus bolster earnings 
per share (Bens et al., 2003).  
Several studies have documented a bifurcation in the value implications of share 
repurchases depending on the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. Caton et al. (2016) show 
that the post-announcement returns to repurchase plans are significantly greater for well-
governed firms as compared to firms with weak governance. They define well-governed firms 
as those with a low score for the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) anti-takeover provisions 
index.3  Manconi et al. (2019) document that share repurchases are, on average, associated with 
positive short-term and long-term returns, but that these effects are significantly larger for 
companies subject to better country-level and firm-level governance mechanisms. 
A wealth of research has probed into various types of complementarities between 
governance mechanisms and share repurchases that may alleviate agency problems within the 
firm. For instance, Banerjee et al. (2018) document that institutional investors promote firms’ 
repurchase decisions to avoid value-destroying overinvestment. Oswald and Young (2008) 
show that the likelihood to engage in share repurchases to distribute excess cash increases with 
boards’ equity incentives. Drawing on the idea that board independence may make companies 
adopt share repurchases to improve its governance oversight vis-à-vis self-interested managers, 
we posit that: 
H1b. A greater share of independent directors has a positive effect on share repurchases under 
the assumption that share repurchases are good. 
 
 
3 A count from 0 to 6 of six antitakeover provisions found most associated with performance, including 




2.3. Independent directors and the real effects of share repurchases 
Earnings pressure is the heart of the popular debate about share repurchases, which has 
suggested that EPS management is a controversial motive that makes firms embark on share 
repurchases. For instance, the existing literature has shown that EPS-accretive share 
repurchases have negative consequences on real firm outcomes, such as employment and 
research and development (Almeida et al., 2016). Growing inequality, stagnation in 
employment numbers and workers' compensation have also been linked to increased share 
repurchases (Tung & Milani, 2018). 
Boards are argued to be more effective in their advisory and oversight roles when the 
share of independent directors is higher (Adams et al., 2010; Driver & Guedes, 2012; Sharma, 
2011). As a result, independent directors have been shown to have sufficient technical 
knowledge or incentives to identify the right opportunities in R&D investment and innovation 
activities (Balsmeier et al., 2017). Through their expertise and experience, independent 
directors also assist the firm with capital allocation and the right investment opportunity 
identification (Chen & Chen, 2012). By aligning the incentives of executives and shareholders, 
independent directors will make the firm benefit from the financial flexibility of share 
repurchases to disgorge excess cash while mitigating the harmful effect of EPS-accretive share 
repurchases stemming from managerial opportunism on real outcomes such as employment. 
Based on these insights, we argue that: 
H2. A greater share of independent directors attenuates the negative effect of manipulative 








3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data sources 
To build our dataset of UK-listed firms, we gather information from six different sources: 
Boardex, Compustat Global, Datastream, Zephyr, Fame, and I/B/E/S. From the Compustat 
Global database we extract financial and accounting data on FTSE All-Share companies, using 
active as well as inactive and suspended listings to avoid survivors’ bias. We complement this 
database with market data and dividend data from Datastream. We include share repurchasing 
data from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr, a database of deal information, used in prior studies on 
share repurchases (Choi, Huh, & Park, 2009); share ownership data from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Fame, a database of companies in the UK and Ireland; analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share 
from I/B/E/S; and board directors’ data, including compensation, from Boardex. We match each 
of these data sources and, in line with previous studies, exclude firms in the financial and 
utilities sectors. The final sample contains 236 unique firms for a total of 1,555 observations 
from 2000 to 2007.4 
 
3.2. Variables 
The key dependent variable for our analysis is the amount of open market share repurchases in 
the UK, in natural logarithms (L. Nguyen, Vu, & Yin, 2020). Repurchase announcements that 
are rumored, withdrawn or waiting for shareholders’ approval are removed. Throughout our 
study (2000-2007), we observe 77 repurchases (4.86% of the sample), with most of them 
happening in 2004 (15), 2005 (23) and 2006 (19). Some companies went through an increase 
of independent directors and did share repurchases in the Higgs period, and others did not, 
 
4 When we combine different databases, we lose some observations, especially due to limitations of the Boardex 
data. For example, when reconciling the Boardex dataset to the FTSE250 index, we obtain 56 firms in 2000, 61 
in 2001, 59 in 2002, 60 in 2003, 57 in 2004, 55 in 2005, 52 in 2006, and 51 in 2007, which is about a fifth of the 
index. However, we still believe that our sample is representative of the entire population of the UK firms that do 




which allows us to test the effect of independent directors on share repurchases with a robust 
empirical method. 
The main explanatory variable for our analysis is the number of independent directors 
scaled by the total number of board directors (Farinha, 2003; Sharma, 2011). During our sample 
period, UK boards feature an average of around one-third of independent directors, where, by 
independent we mean outside and non-affiliated directors, which should thus be independent 
of the firm in their judgment and action and equally represent the interests of all the 
shareholders. 
 We then move to the description of a specific set of control variables that are taken from 
the payout literature (Sharma, 2011; Von Eije & Megginson, 2008). First, in order to capture 
differences in a firm’s size and stage of development, we compute the logarithm of the book 
value of total assets, and the logarithm of firm age expressed in years (Denis & Osobov, 2008). 
Second, to control for differences in firm profitability, we compute the ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax, and depreciation to total assets (ROA) (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006). 
Moreover, we control for a firm’s investment opportunities and undervaluation by using the 
ratio of the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets (Fama & French, 2001; 
Von Eije & Megginson, 2008). We then account for the role of a firm’s capital structure by 
computing a leverage ratio defined as the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. 
In order to capture relative differences in CEO power across firms, we control for the ratio of 
CEO compensation, including options to control for the motivation to mitigate the dilution 
effect from option exercise, scaled by the average compensation of all board directors in a given 
firm and year (Petrou & Procopiou, 2016).5 The inclusion of investment opportunities, leverage, 
and CEO compensation also helps to control for potential mechanisms through which 
 
5 Investors may prefer share repurchases to dividends because of tax advantages. In fact, while in most countries, 
dividends are taxed in their totality, share repurchases are taxed on the capital gain, permitting a higher net income 
to the investor. However, tax effects in our sample should be minor as there were no major UK tax changes to 




independent directors could influence dividend policy (Cuny, Martin, & Puthenpurackal, 2009; 
Fenn & Liang, 2001; Sharma, 2011). Finally, depending on the specification, we control for 
industry dummies, to account for constant heterogeneity across sectors, firm fixed effects, to 
further remove all the sources of constant heterogeneity at the firm level, and year dummies to 
account for shocks common to our sample firms. We do not control for dividends as there is 
little evidence of substitution between dividends and repurchases in the UK (Driver et al., 
2020). In the second part of the analysis, we will study the real effects of share repurchases by 
using as dependent variables the annual growth in the number of employees, and the number of 
employees scaled by total assets. 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables are provided in Table 1, Panel A and B, while 
the complete definition of each variable is provided in Table A1 of the Appendices. To clarify 
whether share repurchases were impacted by an increase in independent directors, a decrease 
in insiders, or board size, we provide more evidence on the total number of independent 
directors, insiders and the total board size in Table 1 Panel A. Over the studied period, the 
average board size remained stable, while the average number of independent directors 
increased from 1.77 in 2000 to 2.20 in 2007. The average number of inside and affiliated 
directors has decreased from 5.88 in 2000 to 5.46 in 2007 (with a median of 6 in 2000 and 5 in 
2007). In other words, the increase in the share of independent directors resulted from a 










4. Empirical design and results 
4.1. Effect of board independence on share repurchases: Difference-in-differences estimation 
To alleviate problems of endogeneity in the representation of independent directors, we follow 
the approach proposed in Dahya et al. (2016) which uses the passage of the Higgs report in the 
UK to build a quasi-natural experiment.6 The Higgs report was issued in January 2003 and 
contained several corporate governance recommendations for UK listed firms (Aguilera, 2005). 
The report explicitly advocated in favor of having the majority of the board formed by 
independent non-executive directors. As Dahya et al. (2016) discuss, this recommendation 
triggered a shock to the corporate governance equilibrium of firms, which were exogenously 
encouraged to increase the number of independent members in their boards of directors. The 
remainder of the Higgs Report was dedicated to further issues on the role and effectiveness of 
independent directors, including recommendations on how to improve their independence, how 
to appoint a senior independent director, and how to establish procedures for hiring, training, 
and remunerating of independent directors. The report contained other board-related 
recommendations, such as the separation of Chairman and CEO roles. 
Although the recommendations in the report were not compulsory, many firms followed 
them strictly by increasing the quota of independent directors (Dahya et al., 2016). Whether an 
event is mandatory or voluntary, what matters for the identification is that it was exogenous to 
firm conditions. In the aftermath of the passage of the Higgs report, companies experienced a 
marked increase in the fraction of independent directors, which gives support for our 
identification strategy. The fiscal years of the UK publicly listed firms are mostly aligned with 
the passage of the Higgs report in January 2003, as about three-quarters of the UK listed firms 
have their financial year ends in December (over 60%), June or September7, meaning that if the 
 
6 A more radical change in the corporate governance of UK listed firms is provided by the issuance of the Cadbury 
report in 1992. Unfortunately, our data do not date back that far, and thus we are bound to only use the Higgs 
report for our identification strategy. 




increase of independent directors’ ratio has taken place in 2003, it would be likely related to the 
Higgs effect and reflected in the annual report of that year. 
We provide results from an estimation strategy that takes advantage of the passage of 
the Higgs report as a quasi-natural experiment. To this end, we construct a variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 measuring for each firm the exposure to the Higgs report, i.e. the change in the 
representation of independent directors from its average ratio computed in the pre-Higgs period 
(up until the year 2003). A greater (positive) value means that, relative to its historical average, 
the firm has increased to a larger extent the share of independent directors after the 
implementation of the Higgs report. We then interact this variable with the post-Higgs dummy 
variable 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡, as previously defined. The resulting model can be seen as a difference-in-
differences specification in which the post-Higgs dummy 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 gives the longitudinal variation 
around the reform, and the change in board independence 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 provides a continuous 
treatment. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 does not change over time, but the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 should change 
with time. The model, reported in equation (1), is estimated using clustered standard errors by 
firm. 
ln 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 
                                                     +𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + +𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                               (1) 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results obtained using, alternatively, the logarithm of 
share repurchases or the repurchase dummy as the dependent variable. Our findings indicate 
that the post-Higgs dummy is positive and statistically significant. In other words, the later 
years in our sample were associated with an increase in repurchases common to all firms. 
However, the interaction between the post-Higgs dummy and the treatment variable indicates 
that firms exposed to a greater increase in the share of independent directors also exhibited a 
greater increase in both the amount and the likelihood of share repurchases.8 In Panel B, we 
 




augment the specification of Panel A with the host of firm-level controls. Confirming our 
previous insights, the interaction between the post-Higgs dummy and the treatment variable is 
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. These results provide evidence for 
hypothesis H1b.  
Our results are robust to excluding the year 2000 from the analysis as well as to 
including cash (in logarithm) as an additional control variable.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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While no identification strategy is without flaws, we conduct several robustness tests to 
remediate possible issues. The key assumption for the validity of our differences-in-differences 
estimates is that firms with different levels of independent directors before the passage of the 
Higgs report did not display diverging trends in share repurchases before the recommendations 
of the report went into effect. To verify that this condition holds, we construct a dummy that 
simulates a placebo passage of the Higgs report in 2002 (and thus taking the value of one from 
2002 onward, and zero before 2002). We then interact this dummy with our treatment variable 
introduced above and include in the regression the controls of the previous analyses. As shown 
in Table 3 Panel A, the interaction between the placebo passage of the Higgs report and the 
treatment dummy does not have any significant effect on share repurchases. This evidence is 
useful to validate the causal interpretation of our findings: share repurchases increase after the 
implementation of the Higgs report (and the related increase in board independence). 
Higgs published a consultation document on June 7th, 2002, which outlined proposals 
regarding board composition. This document creates the possibility that firms with fiscal year-




(expected) proposals early and, as a result, the post-Higgs dummy variable used in the DID 
model may not yield a clean break in board composition. We partly addressed this anticipation 
concern above, where we show that no change in share repurchase occurs prior to or in 2003. 
To further address this issue, we calibrate the post-Higgs dummy with different beginning years 
for the post-Higgs period, from 2002 to 2006. As illustrated in Table 3 Panel B, results indicate 
that the coefficient of the interaction between the post-Higgs dummy and the treatment variable 
is statistically insignificant if the beginning of the treatment is moved to the year 2002 or 2003 
(i.e., including the effect of the consultation report). Conversely, the interaction is significant 
and positive in 2004 and 2005 (at p<0.05 and p<0.01 levels), and then becomes insignificant in 
2006. Collectively, these findings lend additional support for our initial identification strategy.    
A final concern is about confounding policies passed in the same timeframe as the Higgs 
report. Specifically, the Higgs report overlaps with a change in UK Company Law that allowed 
firms to treat share repurchases as treasury stock: prior to 1 December 2003 firms had to cancel 
all repurchased shares, which limited management’s ability to use repurchases to offset the 
dilutive impact of option plans. The change in regulation was motivated by a desire to increase 
repurchase flexibility. It is plausible that this structural change may have impacted on the role 
of repurchases and the link with board composition. However, this is a common shock to all 
firms in our sample, which we control for in the following ways. First, our specification contains 
year effects – aimed at capturing time events common to all firms. Second, our specification 
captures the effect that the Higgs passage triggered on the share of independent directors, which 
varies across firms for a given year. Because the increase in flexibility from the treasury stock 
reform affected all firms with no exemptions, our result is unlikely to suffer from bias coming 
from such simultaneous policy passage. There is a possibility that board independence could 
have an interactive effect with the propensity to use the treasury option (via an increase in the 




shareholder value), in which case both effects lead to an increase in share repurchases via an 
increase in board independence, and since both laws are taking place at the same period, it is 
rather irrelevant of how this exogenous event is labeled. The primary purpose of our paper is to 
use an exogenous shock to treat the endogeneity of board independence, and not to study what 
effect Higgs Report (or other regulation) had on repurchases per se.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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4.2. Independent directors and the real effect of share repurchases 
Our results so far have shown that an exogenous influx of independent directors in UK 
corporate boards increased the propensity of firms to engage in share repurchases. This section 
is devoted to understanding the real effects of such changes in payout policy. On the one hand, 
if independent directors are ineffective at avoiding problems of short-termism or at removing 
distortions in the allocation of resources within the company, then firms with more independent 
directors may engage in share buybacks at the expense of long-term growth. The short-termism 
of independent directors may be induced by an increased reliance on equity-based 
compensation where they are incentivized not to challenge or even push for decisions such as 
share repurchases which improve their own personal wealth due to their pay being linked to the 
current share price (Brochet, Loumioti, & Serafeim, 2015; Dhanani & Roberts, 2009). The issue 
of short-termism induced by equity-based pay may be further exacerbated by the lack of 
understanding independent directors may have of complex internal issues that executives alone 
possess (Deakin, 2018; Driver et al., 2020). This may lead executive directors to exploit the 
allocations of capital to share repurchases to fit their own benefits at the expense of real 




from its flexibility and timing advantages, then firms with greater board independence will 
display a lower tendency to trade off real growth with share repurchases.  
We conduct this analysis, following Almeida et al. (2016), by using (1) the annual 
growth in a firm’s employees, and (2) the number of employees scaled by assets as dependent 
variables in our 2SLS specification. The key explanatory variables are the share of independent 
directors, the likelihood of accretive share repurchases, and the interaction between these two 
terms.  
                              𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
=  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 � 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝚤𝚤𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 × 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝚤𝚤𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝚤𝚤𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                    (2) 
To better evaluate the impact of independent directors on share repurchases, we separate the 
effects on accretive firms (i.e., those firms that do share repurchases for earnings management 
purposes which we consider manipulative)9 and non-accretive firms. While we do not have 
private information on the motives of share repurchases, using the I/B/E/S databank, we can 
record the extent to which a firm’s results consistently differed from the forecasts made by 
equity analysts, and this approach has been used in prior finance and accounting literature such 
as (Almeida et al., 2016; Farrell, Yu, & Zhang, 2013). In line with Almeida et al. (2016), we 
 
9 There is also evidence that managers manipulate reported earnings using discretionary accruals (Bergstresser & 
Philippon, 2006; Farrell, Unlu, & Yu, 2014), i.e. components of earnings that are not reflected in current cash 
flows. One method of manipulating earnings is to take operating expenses that are not reasonably expected to 
generate future cash flows and to capitalize them as capital expenditures. Deciding on the value of credit sales 
involves managerial discretion as to making assumptions about the speed with which customers pay and the 
proportion of customer default rate. Existing studies find that both superior stock performance and improvement 
in operating performance following share repurchases are driven by pre-repurchase downward earnings 
management through accruals rather than genuine growth in profitability (Gong et al., 2008). Further, AGM 
resolutions granting management power to repurchase shares often stipulate that the impact can be EPS 
accretive. Hence, accretiveness may be a necessary condition to establish manipulative intent but it may not be 





propose that persistent underestimation of future EPS by analysts increases a firm’s incentives 
to engage in earnings management through share repurchases.10 
Following the existing literature (Driver et al., 2020; Farrell et al., 2013), we classify 
firms as accretive when the year ahead actual EPS exceeds the average EPS forecast for that 
year reported in the I/B/E/S database (and non-accretive otherwise). The surprise in analysts’ 
estimates measured by this proxy is indicative of a firm’s likelihood of engaging in share 
repurchasing behavior that is reflected in higher EPS than forecasted by analysts (cf. Table A1 
for further definition). 
We conduct univariate t-tests comparing accretive share repurchase firms and non-
accretive firms (Table A2 of the Appendices). Accretive firms are, on average, more likely to 
conduct share repurchases, they repurchase higher amounts and have higher director equity-
linked compensation. They are also larger, more profitable, have lower leverage and higher 
market-to-book ratio. These results provide some indirect evidence suggesting that accretive 
firms are more likely to engage in share repurchases for earnings management purposes.  
As shown in Table 4, accretive share repurchases have a direct negative effect on both 
employee growth and employees to assets ratio. In other words, this form of share repurchases 
is negatively associated with employment, as evidenced by Almeida et al. (2016). However, 
confirming hypothesis 2, the analysis shows that the share of independent directors attenuates 
the negative effect of accretive repurchases on employment, as the interaction term between the 
two variables is positive and statistically significant. Taken together, these results rule out the 
view that board independence increases share repurchases at the expense of a firm’s 
employment. Rather, it appears that independent directors are effective at mitigating the 
negative real effects of accretive repurchases on firm employment.11 
 
10 The current value of cumulative EPS surprise becomes public information in the current year. 
11 We have also analysed the effects of share repurchases on sales growth. Results go in the expected direction (i.e. 





Insert Table 4 here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we used a panel of UK listed firms to investigate the novel question of how board 
independence affects share repurchases. To alleviate endogeneity issues, we have employed a 
quasi-natural experiment taking advantage of exogenous corporate governance reform in the 
UK in 2003. As we argued, the relationship between board independence and share repurchases 
is theoretically ambiguous. Some works suggest that the relationship should be negative, due 
to the ability of independent directors to restrain opportunistically motivated share repurchases 
by executives. Other works advocate more in favor of a positive effect, according to which 
independent directors will take advantage of the greater flexibility of share repurchases to 
reduce the agency cost of free cash flow and return profits. 
Our findings indicated that an increase in the ratio of independent directors is positively 
associated with both the amount and the likelihood of share repurchases. Going beyond this 
average effect, we explored the implications of the nexus between independent directors and 
share repurchases for the ability of firms to grow. Our analysis indicated that while accretive 
share repurchases (i.e., those done for earnings management purposes) harm firm employment, 
this effect is attenuated by having a greater share of independent members on the board of 
directors. These findings suggest that independent directors were efficient at monitoring and 
advising against share repurchases that would destroy long-term shareholder value.  
Several policymakers and practitioners have recently advocated in favor of share 
repurchases. Our results suggest that careful consideration should be made as to which reasons 
push companies to buy back their shares. Greater involvement of independent directors in 
capital allocation processes and payout decisions would help firms and shareholders to engage 
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Panel A: Board Characteristics 
 
  Year = 2000 Year = 2001 Year = 2002 Year = 2003 Year = 2004 Year = 2005 Year = 2006 Year = 2007 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Number Independent 
directors 
1.77 2.00 1.93 2.00 1.92 2.00 1.92 2.00 1.96 2.00 2.06 2.00 2.13 2.00 2.20 2.00 
Share independent 
directors 
22.7% 22.2% 24.8% 25.0% 24.9% 25.0% 24.7% 25.0% 25.3% 25.0% 26.2% 25.0% 27.5% 28.6% 28.5% 28.6% 
Number non-
independent directors 
5.88 6.00 5.82 5.00 5.61 5.00 5.72 6.00 5.68 5.00 5.64 5.50 5.51 5.00 5.46 5.00 
Total Board 7.65 7.00 7.75 8.00 7.53 7.00 7.64 7.00 7.64 7.00 7.70 8.00 7.65 7.00 7.67 7.00 










Panel B: Main Variables 
 
 
The table presents the summary statistics for the main variables employed in the empirical analysis. Ln 
repurchases is the logarithm of the amount of share repurchases. The repurchase dummy is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm undertakes share repurchases and zero otherwise. Ln dividends is the 
logarithm of the amount of dividend payments. Ln total assets is the logarithm of the book value of total 
assets. Ln firm age is the logarithm of a firm’s age expressed in years. ROA is the ratio between a firm’s 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets. Market to book is a 
ratio between the market value of equity and book value of assets. CEO compensation ratio is the Total 
compensation of the CEO relative to the average total compensation of all board directors. Cum. EPS 
surprise is a cumulative difference between the actual earnings per share for the current year and the one-
step, two-step and three-step ahead forecasts previously made for current earnings per share. A complete 
definition of variables is provided in Table A1. 
  
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Median 
Ln repurchases 1,555 -6.487 1.931 -6.908 
Repurchase dummy 1,555 0.047 0.212 0.000 
Repurchases (in million GBP) 1,555 1.401   13.719 0.000 
Ln dividends 1,505 -0.062 3.586 1.411 
Ln total assets 1,555 250.994 186.797 185.527 
Ln firm age 1,555 2.683 0.857 2.773 
ROA 1,555 0.066 0.203 0.085 
Market to book 1,555 4.519 32.015 0.969 
Leverage 1,555 0.174 0.197 0.142 
Share independent directors 1,555 0.255 0.123 0.250 
CEO compensation ratio 1,555 1.951 0.840 1.875 






 Difference-in-differences Estimates 
 
This table provides results from a set of difference-in-differences regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the share of independent directors (in column 1) or 
the repurchase dummy (in column 2). The key explanatory variables are: (1) a 
dummy equal to one for the post-Higgs years of 2004 onward, and zero for the years 
from 2000 to 2003, (2) a continuous variable indicating the difference between the 
share of independent directors in the years of the post-Higgs period and a firm’s 
historical average of board independence computed from 2000 to 2003, and (3) the 
interaction between these two variables. Panel A shows the results obtained only 
using these explanatory variables, whereas Panel B further includes the set of firm-
level controls described in Table 1, firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-
clustered standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Treatment variable is omitted 
from Panel B because it is time-invariant and fixed effects difference it out. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Panel A.  





 (1) (2) 
Post × Treatment 1.933** 0.216**  
 (0.936) (0.097)    
Post 0.392*** 0.045*** 
 (0.096) (0.011)    
Treatment 0.203 0.004    
 (0.457) (0.049)    
Firm fixed effects No No 
Year fixed effects No No 
Observations 1,555 1,555 
 
Panel B. 





 (1) (2) 
Post × Treatment 1.394* 0.174**  
 (0.775) (0.086) 
Post 0.374*** 0.043*** 
 (0.115) (0.013) 
Ln total assets -0.001* -0.000*   
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln firm age 0.133 0.016 
 (0.191) (0.022) 
ROA 0.473 0.048 
 (0.298) (0.034) 
Market to book 0.004 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.34 0.018 
 (0.359) (0.033) 
CEO compensation ratio 0.060 0.005 
 (0.058) (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 




Table 3.  
Robustness Tests 
Panel A: Testing the Parallel Trend Assumption 
 
 
This table provides results from a set of difference-in-differences regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the share of independent directors (in column 1) or 
the repurchase dummy (in column 2). The key explanatory variable is the 
interaction between a dummy equal to one for the placebo post-Higgs period set 
from 2002 onward, and zero for the years 2000 and 2001, and a continuous variable 
indicating the difference between the share of independent directors in the years of 
the post-Higgs period and a firm’s historical average of board independence 
computed from 2000 to 2003. Each regression further includes the set of firm-level 
controls described in Table 1, firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-clustered 
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Panel B: Sensitivities to the Start Year of Post-Treatment Period (Difference-in-difference Estimates) 
 
This table provides the sensitivities of the coefficient of Post*Treatment variable (as per Table 4) to Ln repurchases, robust 
standard errors, t-values, p-values, and the confidence intervals, depending on the beginning year for the post-treatment 
period. 






 (1) (2) 
Placebo×Treatment 0.502 0.078 
 (0.952) (0.100) 
Ln total assets -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln firm age 0.485** 0.056**  
  (0.204)  (0.023) 
ROA 0.477 0.048 
  (0.305)  (0.035) 
Market to book 0.005 0.001 
  (0.003) 0.000 
Leverage 0.305 0.014 
  (0.356)  (0.032) 
CEO compensation ratio 0.062 0.006 
  (0.059)  (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 













Year=2002 0.020 0.125 0.16 0.871 -0.225 0.266 
Year=2003 0.106 0.171 0.62 0.535 -0.231 0.443 
Year=2004 0.358 0.174 2.05 0.041 0.014 0.701 
Year=2005 0.697 0.210 3.32 0.001 0.283 1.110 











This table provides results of the second stage from a 2SLS regression. The dependent variable is the 
annual growth in employee numbers from the previous period (in column 1) or the ratio of employees 
to total assets (in column 2). The key explanatory variable in the first stage regression (not reported) is 
a dummy equal to one for the post-Higgs years of 2004 onward, and zero for the years from 2000 to 
2003. The key explanatory variable in the second stage is the instrumented share of independent 
directors from the first stage. It is interacted with another explanatory variable, accretive repurchase, a 
binary variable (1/0) taking 1 if a firm is doing share repurchases and if it engages in earnings 
management through EPS manipulation, and 0 otherwise.  A set of firm-level controls described in 
Table 1 and firm fixed effects are included. Firm-clustered standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 








to assets  
 (1) (2)  
Accretive repurchase -0.447* -0.018** 
  (0.263)  (0.007) 
Share independent directors × Accretive repurchases 1.720* 0.066** 
  (1.005)  (0.027) 
Share independent directors -0.595 -0.077*** 
  (1.343)  (0.024) 
Ln total assets 0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln firm age -0.131* 0.002* 
  (0.077)  (0.001) 
ROA 0.089 -0.002 
  (0.060)  (0.001) 
Market to book 0.002 0.000* 
  (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.014 0.003** 
  (0.059)  (0.002) 
CEO compensation ratio 0.001 0.000 
  (0.016) (0.000) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes 









Variables  Source Description  
Ln 
repurchases 
Zephyr Share repurchases, in nominal values and in millions of GBP, in 
natural logarithms, and transformed (we add 0.001 to the share 




Zephyr A binary variable (1/0) taking 1 if a firm is doing share 
repurchases in a given year, and 0 otherwise 
Cash 
dividends 
Datastream Amounts paid by cash dividend payers, in nominal values and in 
millions of GBP, in natural logarithms, and transformed (we add 





Ratio of total cash dividends to share repurchases, both in 
nominal values and in millions of GBP 
Employee 
growth 
Compustat Annual employee growth 
Employee/ 
assets 




Boardex Percentage of independent directors, calculated as the number of 
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on 




Boardex Total compensation of CEO relative to average total 
compensation of all board directors for a given firm 
Post n.a. A binary variable (1/0) equal to one for the years from 2004 to 
2007 (with the Higgs corporate governance reform in place) and 
zero for the pre-reform years of 2000-2003 
Treatment n.a. A variable measuring for each firm the exposure to the Higgs 
report, i.e. the change in the representation of independent 
directors from its average ratio computed in the pre-Higgs period 
Placebo n.a. A binary variable (1/0) taking the value of one from 2002 
onward, and zero before 2002 
Ln firm age Compustat 
Global 
The logarithm of the age of the firm expressed in years 
ROA Compustat 
Global 
The earnings ratio of a company defined as the earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total 
assets 
CEO duality Boardex A binary variable (1/0) taking 1 if a CEO also assumes the role 
of Chairman, and 0 otherwise 
Leverage Compustat 
Global 




I/B/E/S The cumulative difference between the actual earnings per share 
for the current year t and the one-year ahead estimate for the 
current year (FY1), two-year (FY2) and three-year ahead (FY3) 
forecasts previously made for current earnings per share for a 
firm i: ∑ [(𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹1)𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) + (𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹2)𝑡𝑡 −𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡) + (𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹3)𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡)] 
FY1 EPS 
surprise 




Zephyr, I/B/E/S A binary variable (1/0) taking 1 if a firm is doing share 




Variables  Source Description  
EPS manipulation (positive FY1 EPS surprise as described 
above), and 0 otherwise 
 
Table A2. 
t-Tests Comparison of Accretive Share Repurchase Firms and Non-accretive Share Repurchase Firms 
 
 Accretive share 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









































































This table reports the mean values, differences and t-test values of the differences between values of variables for accretive 
share repurchase firms with earnings management motives and the matching non-accretive share repurchase firms. The firms 
are included in the ‘accretive’ group if the year ahead actual EPS exceeds the average EPS forecast for that year reported in 
the I/B/E/S database (the values in parentheses are calculated based on the split of sample between accretive and non-accretive 
firms according to the cumulative difference between the actual earnings per share for the current year and the one-step, two-
step and three-step ahead forecasts previously made for current earnings per share: if the difference is over 1, firms are included 
in the accretive group, and non-accretive otherwise).  
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
